|
Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
|
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992
DAVID SALLY
Cornell University
This article presents an analysis of 35 years of published experiments testing decision making in prisoners' dilemmas. The objective is to begin to reconnect the theory and the evidence of rational behavior by accumulating the experience of the laboratory and examining this record for those factors that consistently altered subjects' choices. It is shown that a model of pure self-interest is usually inconsistent with the results of experimental decision making, predicting either the wrong sign, as in the case of monetary stakes, or ignoring influential variables, such as the content of instructions. This incongruity is widest with respect to the role of language in encouraging cooperation.
Rationality and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1,
58-92 (1995)
DOI: 10.1177/1043463195007001004
 CiteULike  Complore  Connotea  Del.icio.us  Digg  Reddit  Technorati  Twitter What's this?
This article has been cited by other articles:
|
|
|
|
 
C. A. Klofstad
Civic Talk and Civic Participation: The Moderating Effect of Individual Predispositions
American Politics Research,
September 1, 2009;
37(5):
856 - 878.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
T. Miettinen and S. Suetens
Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
December 1, 2008;
52(6):
945 - 960.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
D. M Levy and S. J Peart
Sympathetic Bias
Statistical Methods in Medical Research,
June 1, 2008;
17(3):
265 - 277.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I. Bohnet and Y. Baytelman
Institutions and Trust: Implications for Preferences, Beliefs and Behavior
Rationality and Society,
February 1, 2007;
19(1):
99 - 135.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
C. Pavitt, V. Zingerman, E. Towey, and C. McFeeters
Group Communication During Resource Dilemmas: 2. Effects of Harvest Limit and Reward Asymmetry
Communication Research,
February 1, 2006;
33(1):
64 - 91.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
M. G. Haselton and D. Nettle
The Paranoid Optimist: An Integrative Evolutionary Model of Cognitive Biases
Personality and Social Psychology Review,
February 1, 2006;
10(1):
47 - 66.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B. Torgler and C. A. Schaltegger
Tax Amnesties and Political Participation
Public Finance Review,
May 1, 2005;
33(3):
403 - 431.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B. S. Frey and M. Osterloh
Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats
Journal of Management Inquiry,
March 1, 2005;
14(1):
96 - 111.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B. Robbins
"That's Cheap." the Rational Invocation of Norms, Practices, and an Ethos in Ultimate Frisbee
Journal of Sport and Social Issues,
August 1, 2004;
28(3):
314 - 337.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
J. Sell, M. J. Lovaglia, E. A. Mannix, C. D. Samuelson, and R. K. Wilson
Investigating Conflict, Power, and Status Within and Among Groups
Small Group Research,
February 1, 2004;
35(1):
44 - 72.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
C. Bicchieri
Covenants without Swords: Group Identity, Norms, and Communication in Social Dilemmas
Rationality and Society,
May 1, 2002;
14(2):
192 - 228.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
D. Sally
`What an Ugly Baby!': Risk Dominance, Sympathy, and the Coordination of Meaning
Rationality and Society,
February 1, 2002;
14(1):
78 - 108.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B. ROTHSTEIN
Cooperation for Social Protection: Explaining Variation in Welfare Programs
American Behavioral Scientist,
January 1, 2002;
45(5):
901 - 918.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
D. Richards
Reciprocity and Shared Knowledge Structures in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
October 1, 2001;
45(5):
621 - 635.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
D. Sally
A general theory of sympathy, mind-reading, and social interaction, with an application to the Prisoners' Dilemma
Social Science Information,
December 1, 2000;
39(4):
567 - 634.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
B. Rothstein
Trust, Social Dilemmas and Collective Memories
Journal of Theoretical Politics,
October 1, 2000;
12(4):
477 - 501.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
E. v. Dijk and H. Wilke
Conditional Contributions and Public Good Provision: Perceptions, Motives, and Behavioral Reactions
Group Processes Intergroup Relations,
July 1, 1999;
2(3):
245 - 258.
[Abstract]
[PDF]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
T. Wagner
RECIPROCITY AND EFFICIENCY
Rationality and Society,
August 1, 1998;
10(3):
347 - 375.
[Abstract]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
R. K. Wilson and J. Sell
"Liar, Liar... ": Cheap Talk and Reputation in Repeated Public Goods Settings
Journal of Conflict Resolution,
October 1, 1997;
41(5):
695 - 717.
[Abstract]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
S. J. Meardon and A. Ortmann
SELF-COMMAND IN ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS: A GAME-THEORETIC REINTERPRETATION
Rationality and Society,
February 1, 1996;
8(1):
57 - 80.
[Abstract]
|
|
|
|
|
